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Abstract
As the recent crisis has forcefully suggested, understanding ﬁnancial-market interconnect-
edness is of a paramount importance to explain systemic risk, stability and economic
dynamics. In this paper, we address these issues along two related perspectives. First,
we explore the statistical properties of the International Financial Network (IFN), deﬁned
as the weighted-directed multigraph where nodes are world countries and links represent
debtor-creditor relationships in equities and short/long-run debt. We investigate whether
the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis has resulted in a signiﬁcant change in the topological properties
of the IFN. Our ﬁndings suggest that the crisis caused not only a reduction in the amount
of securities traded, but also induced changes in the topology of the network and in the
time evolution of its statistical properties. This has happened, however, without changing
the disassortative, core-periphery structure of the IFN architecture. Second, we perform
an econometric study to examine the ability of network-based measures to explain cross-
country diﬀerences in crisis intensity. We investigate whether the conclusion of previous
studies showing that international connectedness is not a relevant predictor of crisis inten-
sity may be reversed, once one explicitly accounts for the position of each country within
the IFN. We show that higher interconnectedness reduces the severity of the crisis, as it
allows adverse shocks to dissipate quicker. However, the systemic risk hypothesis cannot
be completely dismissed and being central in the network, if the node is not a member of
a rich club, puts the country in an adverse and risky position in times of crises. Finally,
we ﬁnd strong evidence of nonlinear eﬀects, once the high degree of heterogeneity that
characterizes the IFN is taken into account.
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The recent ﬁnancial crisis has forcefully highlighted the potential problems arising from ﬁnancial
market interconnectedness. From a microeconomic point of view, one of the main reasons
behind the bailout of Bear Stearns, orchestrated by the Federal Reserve in March 2008, was
that the bank was too connected to be allowed to fail. From a macroeconomic perspective,
ﬁnancial integration has allowed problems originated in a relatively small segment of the U.S.
credit market to diﬀuse rapidly and pose a serious threat to the overall stability of the world
economy (Battiston et al., 2011). As stated by Schweitzer et al. (2009), the crisis calls for a
better understanding of the structure and evolution of economic networks, deﬁned as systems
where individual players (agents, banks, countries,...) do not act in isolation but rather are
linked via a complex set of interactions.
Along these lines, even before the eruption of the crisis, several authors had started studying
contagion eﬀects in the inter bank lending network.1 For example, Allen and Gale (2000),
which is often regarded as one of the seminal contributions of this literature, ﬁnd that shocks
are more easily dissipated within complete networks (where all possible bilateral links exists),
whereas incomplete networks tend to be less robust. A similar conclusion is reached by Freixas
et al. (2000) and Leitner (2005). Furthermore, Gai and Kapadia (2010) employ tools borrowed
from the epidemiological literature to show that greater connectivity reduces the likelihood of
widespread default, but also that dense ﬁnancial networks display the tendency to be “robust 
yet fragile”: the probability of contagion is typically low, but when it happens its eﬀects will be
widespread and diﬃcult to isolate. The possible emergence of contagion depends crucially on
the degree of heterogeneity, which can refer either to node intrinsic characteristics (such as size,
see Iori et al., 2006) or to node connectivity (Caccioli et al., 2011). Indeed, when the network is
not homogeneous the positive eﬀect of higher density on diversiﬁcation is counterbalanced by
the fragility associated with the presence of very central (and therefore critical) players. The
existence of extreme behaviors and tipping points is forcefully argued by Haldane and May
(2011), who claim an interdisciplinary network perspective can bring new and useful insights
into ﬁnancial research, especially in the realms of regulation and stability.
From the empirical point of view, greater availability of data has led many researchers
1A concise yet very good overview of the literature on ﬁnancial networks is provided by Allen and Babus
(2009).
2to investigate the structural properties of domestic (e.g. Cocco et al., 2009) and cross border
interbank networks (e.g. von Peter, 2007). Recently, Hale (2011) has built a global banking
network of almost 8,000 large institutions in 141 countries, and found that link formation slows
down during global ﬁnancial crises.
In this paper we focus on the country, rather than bank level (in a way simlar to Schiavo
et al., 2010; Minoiu and Reyes, 2011), and we provide evidence on how the topology of their
ﬁnancial relationships can help us understand what happened after the ﬁnancial shocks of
2008. We deﬁne the International Financial Network (IFN) as a macro weighted directed
(multi) graph where nodes are countries joined by weighted directed links that connect the
issuing country to the holder of the security (possibly disaggregated by type). That is, we have
an outgoing link starting from the issuing country (debtor) and reaching the holding country
(creditor) as shown in Figure 1. By taking a network perspective to the study of the ﬁnancial
crisis, we assess the impact of the crisis on the topological properties of the IFN, and we show







Figure 1: International Financial Network (IFN): a macro weighted directed graph where nodes
are countries joined by directed links. Links connect issuing country to security holder. For
example, A issues securities held by B and D (i.e. A is a debtor of B and D) where wab and
wad are the values of such securities in (millions of) current dollars.
With respect to this last point, the paper refers to the whole literature that has ﬂourished in
the last couple of years, aiming at explaining the cross sectional diﬀerence in crisis intensity (see
Berkmen et al., 2009; Blanchard et al., 2010; Claessens et al., 2010; Rose and Spiegel, 2010, 2011;
Frankel and Saravelos, 2011; Lane and Milesi Ferretti, 2011; Giannone et al., 2011, to quote just
a few). In turn, this is part of a broader eﬀort targeted at establishing an Early Warning System
(EWS) capable of signaling the building up of system risk in international ﬁnancial markets,
mainly at the country level. Diﬀerent oﬃcial sources have called for engineering eﬀective EWSs:
3for instance, the Final Communiqué of the April 2009 G 20 Summit held in London states
“we agree ...that the FSB [Financial Stability Board] should collaborate with the
IMF to provide early warning of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial risks and the actions
needed to address them”.
So far, the many attempts made by diﬀerent authors have focused on crisis intensity, not
its timing, as the latter is much more diﬃcult to forecast. Although diﬀerent methodologies
have been adopted, many works are based on simple cross country OLS regressions of (one or
more) crisis measures on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial indicators (lagged, to correct for possible
endogeneity). The goal of the various empirical exercises is to identify a set of variables that
can eﬀectively explain the diﬀerence in the intensity of the crisis faced by each country.
Despite a large eﬀort (more than 100 candidate explanatory variables are tested by Rose
and Spiegel, 2010, alone), this stream of literature has not been very successful in identifying
a robust set of covariates associated with the severity of the crisis (Rose and Spiegel, 2011).
The way the crisis is deﬁned and measured, the speciﬁc time window analyzed, the number of
explanatory variables used, all aﬀect the results to a certain extent, although the bottom line
remains roughly the same.
Two points are worth noting here. First, data availability imposes serious limitations to
the number of data points in the analysis. Hence, a possible explanation for the lack of robust
results is simply the small sample size (very often ranging between 50 and 80 observations),
a problem for which there is no clear remedy. Second, one of the most striking (negative)
results is, in our own view, the failure to identify international linkages (both in real and
ﬁnancial terms) between each country and the U.S. (the candidate epicenter of the crisis) as a
meaningful predictor of crisis intensity. The evidence for an ‘international channel’ is weak at
best, which is counterintuitive given the strong prior on the role of interconnectedness shared
by many scholars and policymakers.
This paper aims at contributing to the the foregoing debate in at least two ways. First,
we present a description of the main structural features of the IFN and their evolution over
time. Furthermore, we carefully investigate whether the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis has resulted in a
signiﬁcant change in the topological properties of the IFN. Second, given the systemic nature of
the crisis and the recognition that high interconnectedness among ﬁnancial intermediaries has
4played a major role in spreading the crisis, we examine the ability of network based measures
to improve the predictive power of EWS. In particular, we investigate whether international
connectedness is a relevant predictor of crisis intensity when we not only consider bilateral
ﬂows, but we also look at the positions of each country within the IFN.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and network 
related methodology. A network analysis of the main structural features of the international
ﬁnancial network (IFN) and their evolution over time is presented in Section 3. Particular
attention will be devoted to assess the impact of the 2008 crisis on the topological properties of
the network. Section 4 investigates whether augmenting standard models with network based
measures enhances the predictive ability of EWS. This is done using both cross sectional and
panel techniques. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Network Statistics
The main source of data we employ in our analysis is the Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Survey (CPIS), collected by the International Monetary Found (IMF).2 Data include cross 
border portfolio investment holdings of equity securities, long term debt securities and short 
term debt securities listed by country of residence of issuer. Overall, we have complete bilateral
data for roughly 70 countries for the period 2001–2010.
We analyze the topology of the IFN in ﬁve diﬀerent cases: when the graph is built considering
all ﬁnancial investments (Total Portfolio Investments, TPI); when we consider only equity
securities (ES); debt securities (TDS); long term debt securities (LTDS) and short term debt
securities (STDS). More formally, we build a 5 layer weighted directed multigraph, where each
directed link is weighted by the value of security – in millions of current dollars – issued
by the origin node and held by the target, see Figure 2. Since we are also interested in
assessing unweighted relations, we explore the properties of the binary projection of the weighted
multigraph, where each directed link is present if the original weight is positive and does not
exist otherwise.
The data allow us to describe the topological structure of the IFN along the lines of Schiavo
et al. (2010), and track its evolution over time. Particular care is put in testing the hypothesis
2Data are documented and available at http://cpis.imf.org/ (last access January 2012).
5that the ﬁnancial crisis results in a signiﬁcant change in the structure of the IFN. To this extent,
we focus on both aggregate and node speciﬁc network statistics (see appendices A–C for more
formal deﬁnitions).
Aggregate statistics give information on the overall properties of the network. We study
network density (i.e. the fraction of all possible links that are actually present) and two measures
of asymmetry. These are useful to understand the probability that any outgoing link (with a
given weight) is reciprocated (with a similar weight). A network would be fully symmetric
if all links are reciprocated with the same weight. A higher asymmetry imply larger link
unbalances in bilateral interactions. The two indexes of asymmetry are: a measure of absolute
asymmetry (as in Fagiolo, 2006), where we treat all link unbalances as the same; a measure of
relative asymmetry, where the average is taken over the individual relative unbalance averages
(as described in Appendix A).
Node speciﬁc network statistics, instead, allow us to look at individual countries’ positions
within the IFN. That is, we can asses: how many ﬁnancial counter parties a country has
(i.e. node degree measures), how much a country is exposed (i.e. node strength measures),
how much connected and exposed are its neighbors (i.e. average nearest neighbor degree and
strength measures), how much communal are relationship patterns between countries (i.e. node
clustering measures) and how central are individual nodes within the IFN (i.e. centrality
measures). The indicators we use allow us to understand not only how strongly a country is
connected with its neighbors, but also the characteristics of the ﬁnancial partners with which
it decides to trade with. We analyze the web of ﬁnancial relationships not only by checking
the presence and the directionality of linkages, but also by providing diﬀerent versions of the
indicators to consider the intensity of the exchanges. Furthermore, by assessing the centrality
of countries, we also detect which countries are primary sources of investments within the IFN
(i.e. ﬁnancial authorities) and which ones are primary borrowers (i.e. ﬁnancial hubs). The
detailed descriptions of the indicators used along with their economic interpretations are listed
in Appendices B and C.
In addition, we study how node speciﬁc network statistics correlate and how such correlation
patterns evolve across the years. By doing so, we can assess whether the investing behavior of


























Figure 2: International Financial Network Layer Structure: ﬁve diﬀerent layers are analyzed.
Total Portfolio Investments (TPI): when the graph is built considering of all the ﬁnancial
exposures between countries. Equity Securities (ES): when we consider only equity securities.
Total Debt Securities (TDS): when we consider all debt securities. Long term Debt Securities
(LTDS): when we consider only long term debt securities. Short term Debt Securities (STDS):
when we consider only short term debt securities.
3 Evolution of the IFN: Pre and Post-Crisis Evidence
Aggregate Network Statistics We begin by investigating the time evolution of aggregate 
network statistics. Figure 3a shows that the density of TPI has always been increasing over the
years with the only exception of 2008. Indeed, we observe a spike in network density between
2006 and 2007 and then a sudden drop in 2008. This means that the ﬁnancial crisis caused some
countries to revise their relationships with their partners, reducing the number of countries with
which they had ﬁnancial linkages (a result in line with Hale, 2011).
Network asymmetry seems to be generally constant when we consider only the presence
or absence of ﬁnancial linkages, both in the absolute and in the relative case (see Figures
3c,3e). Instead, when we take into account also the intensity of the ﬁnancial relationships, the
behavior is less straightforward. If we look at the absolute weighted network asymmetry index
(see Figure 3d) we observe that in terms of debt securities, the asymmetry is decreasing up
to years 2005/2006, while it is increasing starting from 2007; in terms of equity securities, the
asymmetry is increasing up to year 2007 and decreasing thereafter. Instead, when we look at
the relative weighted asymmetry index, we ﬁnd that asymmetry has been steadily increasing
over the entire period, even though the rate of growth seems not to be particularly fast. Overall,
this suggests that widespread relative unbalances might have driven the network to be level 
asymmetric after 2007.
7Node-speciﬁc Network Statistics In order to get a more ﬁne understanding of the evolu 
tion of IFN topological properties over time, we now turn to analyzing node speciﬁc network
measures. First, note that the shape of the distribution of the number of ﬁnancial relationships
among the countries changes over the years. Overall, we observe that node degree distributions
are bimodal for TPI and ES while they are closer to unimodality for TDS, even though they
exhibit a very long right tail (see Figure 4) However, if we separately observe the behavior
of node in degree and node out degree, we see that the distributions for the latter statistics
are often closer to unimodality than the ones for in degree. Furthermore, bimodality is more
pronounced and increasing in the period 2001 2007, whereas it appears to be less severe in the
years after 2008. All this may suggest a sort of “reversion to the mean” movement, operated
by the nodes that were lying on the right tail of the distribution. This shift is most evident in
the ES layer, since equity securities react more rapidly to changes on the ﬁnancial markets. In
general, we also observe a movement of the distribution to the right, up to 2007, while there is
some settle back in the period 2008–2010. Overall, this means that the ﬁnancial crisis not only
changed the topology of the network by decreasing the overall number of connections among
the countries (see the above evidence on density), but also by altering the distributions of such
relationships. Very connected nodes seem to have reduced their exposures. This is especially
true for nodes that had many creditors compared to average behavior of all other countries.
The mean value of average nearest neighbor degree (ANND, see Figure 5) is instead increas 
ing in the period before the ﬁnancial crisis, it drops in 2008, it increases again in 2009, then it
remains almost constant in 2010. On the other hand, ANND standard deviation is generally
decreasing over time: countries link to more and more connected neighbors, i.e. ANND dis 
tributions are shifting towards the right over time. This may mean that negative shocks can
be absorbed more easily since their impact is shared by many countries. It also suggests that
extreme shocks can diﬀuse more easily throughout the network (Gai and Kapadia, 2010).
Turning to clustering coeﬃcients, we observe that average binary clustering (i.e. BCC) is
increasing over time in the TPI layer (see Figure 6). Actually, the entire distribution shifts
towards the right over the years, with the exception of 2008. This behavior seems to be driven
by the equity security layer. Debt security layers exhibit an increase in average BCC up to
2007, but then the distributions start moving towards the left until 2010. In other words,
8equity securities recovered more quickly from the 2008 shock, whereas investment behavior in
debt securities have been strongly impacted by the crisis. A decrease in clustering coeﬃcients
suggests indeed that each country is contracting debt or credit relationships with countries
that have less probability (compared to the past) of being ﬁnancial partners among themselves.
We observe a similar behavior also when we look at weighted clustering coeﬃcients, the only
diﬀerence being that now, in the debt layers, some recovery seems to be present in 2010 (that
is, the movement towards the left seems to have come to an end).
The same evidence is also observed in many other network statistics, like (in and out) node
strength, average nearest neighbor strength and weighted clustering. This suggests that the
ES layer is the quicker to recover, while relationships based on debt securities seem to require
more time to invert their decreasing trend after the crisis.
Combining together these diﬀerent ﬁndings we can get a glimpse of what is happening to
the IFN after the ﬁnancial crisis. In particular, it seems that the huge shock of 2008 caused not
only a reduction in the amount of securities traded, but also induced changes in the topology
of the network and in the time evolution of its patterns. Countries reduced the number of
their ﬁnancial partners, especially in terms of number of debtors. That is, creditors with
many debtors reduced the number of their counterparts and seemed to have adopted a more
careful selection of their investing opportunities. In 2010, however, this eﬀect was already
over. More generally, in 2007 and 2008 we observed a drop in network density and an increase
in asymmetry, which can be interpreted as a symptom of the riskiness and uncertainty that
was perceived by markets in those years. We have also observed that big creditors decided to
adopt less risky strategies, as exempliﬁed by the movements back towards the mean of node
in strength. Furthermore, core countries appeared to have reduced their exposures towards
network periphery: the left tail of the node out strength (in logs) seems to have ﬂattened after
2007. A number of countries were no longer able to issue large amounts of securities, probably
because they could not manage to ﬁnd creditors willing to support them.
Correlations between Network Statistics In general, one is not only interested in as 
sessing how the moments of the distribution of node statistics change over time, but also the
evolution of their correlation structure, which is the issue we focus on in this subsection.
In 2001–2010, we observe high and positive correlation between node degree and node
9strength (see Figure 7a). This implies that countries with a large number of creditors/debtors
tend also to hold/issue more dollars of securities. By breaking down the correlation even further
we observe that: the correlation between NDin and NSin is generally increasing over time
(with the exception of year 2008), while the correlation between NDout and NSout is generally
decreasing over time (even though both measures remain strongly positive). This means that
countries who have more debtors tend to increase the amount of dollars of securities they hold;
while countries that have more creditors tend to diminish their exposures.
Instead, correlations between node degree/strength and node ANND/ANNS are both high
and negative (see Figures 7b,7c). In line with previous research (Schiavo et al., 2010), we
therefore ﬁnd that the network is very disassortative: neighbors of well connected and highly
inﬂuential countries have fewer creditors/debtors and hold/issue less securities. In particular,
we note that the binary disassortativity seems to have remained roughly constant over time.
Conversely, weighted disassortativity has been reducing after 2005 and node strength/ANNS
correlation appears to be increasing in the last four years of our sample. Hence, during the
crisis, when it comes to counting the number of relationships of the nodes, well connected
countries tended to preferentially engage in relationships with even more peripheral partners,
whereas the result is the opposite if we look at the values of the securities issued or held by the
parties.
Degree clustering correlation is high and negative in the binary case over the whole period
(see Figure 8a). Countries that are creditors/debtors of many countries interact with pairs of
countries that are not typically debtors or creditors of each other and form a hub and spoke
structure. However, the insight is the opposite if we look at the weighted case, where the
correlation is between node strength and WCC (see Figure 8b). Indeed, in this second case
we ﬁnd that correlation is high and positive meaning that countries which hold/issue a lot of
dollars of securities typically interact with pair of countries that are themselves very tightly
interconnected. Put it diﬀerently, when we look at the binary representation of the network, it
appears that “clubs of countries” are not a relevant feature of our data, whereas once we look
at the weighted IFN, we ﬁnd evidence of (local) rich club behavior. This suggests that existing
heterogeneity in link weights is a possible driver for the emergence of rich clubs.
Last, it is rather important to notice that there are no clear structural changes after 2007
10in terms of correlation structures. This means that the overall behavior of countries in the
sample, was not that altered, at the macro level, by the ﬁnancial crisis and that the patterns
that were present before 2007–2008 have not been aﬀected in a consistent manner. This is in
line with previous results on the international trade network (Fagiolo et al., 2009) and hint to
a strong robustness and resilience.
Rich Club Behavior As mentioned when discussing correlation patterns between node
strength and WCC, rich club eﬀects seem to be locally present in the IFN. But what about
rich club evidence at the global level? To explore this issue, we have computed the rich club
coeﬃcient (RCC) as in Opsahl et al. (2008). This coeﬃcient measures the fraction of weights
shared among “rich nodes”, as compared to the total amount they could have shared if they were
connected only through the strongest links in the network. In our case, following Fagiolo et al.
(2009), we chose total node strength as richness parameter. That is, we ranked all countries
in terms of total value (dollars) of securities they held or issued in a given year, considering as
richer those countries that have higher node strength.
To compare RCC observed values with statistically reasonable benchmarks, one has to deﬁne
a null model, i.e. a random network from which to compute expected correlation free RCC to
be compared with the observed ones. In Appendix D we brieﬂy describe the null models that
we have employed for this exercise and in Appendix E we provide a formal deﬁnition of RCC.
Notice that, given any club size, a value larger than one for the RCC implies evidence of
rich club behavior. As we can see from Figure 9, rich clubs do indeed globally emerge in the IFN
and they typically include the top 25/30 countries. This result is consistent regardless the null
model one employs as benchmark.Furthermore, it suggests that the IFN is characterized by a
core periphery structure, where the most strongly connected 25/30 countries are linked among
themselves more than it would have been expected in models assuming the same ﬁrst order
binary and weighted network statistics (in/out node degree and in/out node strength).
Network Centrality Given the rich club structure found above, an interesting issue to ex 
plore concerns assessing ﬁnancial centrality and inﬂuence in the IFN. To do that, we employ
the HITS algorithm (Kleinberg, 1999) to compute hub and authority scores both in the binary
and in the weighted case. They both measure the extent to which a node is central in the
11network, but look at diﬀerent features: authorities (i.e. nodes with a high authority score)
are nodes that are pointed to (via strongly weighted in links) by many hubs, whereas hubs
are nodes that point (via strongly weighted out links) to many authorities. In other words,
authorities are nodes that contain useful information, whereas hubs are nodes that point where
useful information is located. Of course an authoritative node may also be a hub, and vice
versa. In the IFN, ﬁnancial authorities are primary sources of investments (i.e. countries that
hold securities of many countries), while ﬁnancial hubs are primary borrowers (i.e. countries
that issue securities held by many partners).
As we can see in Appendix F, a few interesting patterns emerge looking at the rankings of
the top 30 countries in each of the four centrality measures. As far as binary hub centrality
is concerned, note that top ranks typically feature developed economies (e.g. United States,
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, ...). However, other well known ﬁnancial centers
also pop up as hubs. For example Luxembourg, Switzerland and Cayman Islands typically
score in the top 10/15 positions. Their presence is even more important when we look at the
binary authority centrality: Luxembourg and Switzerland are constantly in the top 5. The U.S.
and U.K., conversely, move a lot up and down in the ranking over the years: the former looses
many positions over time, whereas the latter climbs the ranking up to the second place in four
out of the last ﬁve years. Instead, when we look at weighted centrality measures, the likelihood
that a country exhibits at the same time a large hub and authority score is larger than in the
binary case.
The presence of many tax heavens among the top binary ﬁnancial authorities can be ex 
plained by arguing that many companies around the world moved their ﬁscal residence to these
countries for tax reasons. Therefore, many tax heavens are expected to be listed as important
ﬁnancial authorities. Another interesting ﬁnding is related to the opposite roles that Cayman
Islands and Luxembourg play in the IFN. Cayman Islands are more important as a ﬁnancial
hub than as a ﬁnancial authority. Luxembourg appears to be a ﬁnancial authority but not
a ﬁnancial hub. This could indicate that the former is more important as a country where
depositing money, while the latter is more useful to incorporate companies that then can be
employed as holdings for companies operating elsewhere.
124 Econometric Analysis
In this Section we investigate whether network measures contain useful information that can
improve our understanding of cross country diﬀerences in the severity of the recent ﬁnancial
crisis. We start from the baseline methodology employed in the literature on EWSs, namely
cross sectional (OLS) regression of one or more crisis measures on lagged macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial indicators. Therefore, we use this as a departure point for analysis but then move
towards a more complete analysis that uses two step GMM ﬁrst diﬀerence panel estimation.
Since it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a robust set of covariates, we select a small number of them based
on previous results as well as by means of a preliminary analysis (not presented here in the
interest of space). We need to focus on a small number of explanatory variables because the
sample size is small and we therefore need to keep a reasonable number of degrees of freedom.
Even for the GMM panel estimation, the set of explanatory variables is limited because the
number of instruments constrain the estimation.
4.1 Network Eﬀects
From the previous sections, it is clear that there are a number of network indicators that could
be used for this type of analysis. At the beginning, in the cross section exercise, we opt for
using only six indicators that have a clearer and perhaps more intuitive interpretation, albeit
we will expand the analysis introducing more network measures during the GMM exercise. To
begin with we use the number of creditors and debtors of each country (NDin and NDout)
which allow us to look at ﬁrst degree of separation eﬀects. These indicators can be related,
intuitively, to portfolio returns maximization and risk diversiﬁcation, since these eﬀorts would
lead to lending/borrowing from diﬀerent sources, although the eﬀects of aggregate connectivity
resulting from these eﬀorts could also lead to a higher vulnerability. The four diﬀerent options
for the average nearest neighbor degree (ANND) extend the analysis to second order eﬀects in
that they describe diﬀerent types/characteristics of “lending/credit chains”:
1. The average number of debtors of country i’s creditors (ANND_outin)
2. The average number of debtors of country i’s debtors (ANND_inin)
3. The average number of creditors of country i’s debtors (ANND_inout).
134. The average number of creditors of country i’s creditors (ANND_outout)
For example, as described in Calvo (1998), a given country i can face “capital sudden stops"
because other countries, which borrow from the same creditors, default on their debt. This
jeopardizes the probability that the country in question can successfully reﬁnance its debt,
although it may be ﬁnancially sound. It has to be emphasized that this would be the inter 
pretation from the systemic risk perspective. From the point of view of risk diversiﬁcation,
it can be argued that the more debtors that country i′s creditors have, the less likely is that
a shock from a given country could aﬀect the strong and diversiﬁed portfolio of country i′s
creditors. Similar interpretations can be articulated for each of the ANND versions consid 
ered here, where a larger number of creditors or debtors can be seen as a stronger and more
resilient credit/lending chain but introduces also more interdependency. In the end whether
markets/investors interpret the observed interdependencies as positive (risk diversiﬁcation) or
negative (systemic risk), or with thresholds over which non linearities emerge, is an empirical
question.
4.2 Cross-sectional estimation
The OLS cross sectional regression of a crisis indicator on a parsimonious list of covariates,
where the dataset is built around a crisis window period, intends to assess if during a period
of ﬁnancial distress the position of a country within the network aﬀects its performance, either
by providing ways to diﬀuse/assimilate shocks, or by making the country prone to contagion
(Kali and Reyes, 2010).
Our benchmark econometric speciﬁcation reads:
yi,2008 = γx
′
i,2006 + θgi,2006 + vi,2008 (1)
where yi is any crisis measure, xit is a vector of macro economic controls, git is a vector of
network measures, ui is the error component and i = {1...74}.
Since most of the previous studies has opted for real measures of crisis intensity, we set oﬀ
by looking at the percentage change in real GDP between the second quarter of 2008 and the
second quarter of 2009, in line with Rose and Spiegel (2011).3
3Blanchard et al. (2010) correct real GDP growth by subtracting average growth over the period 1995–2007.
14As to the covariates, taking stock of the literature, we select a small number of explanatory
variables, all referring to 2006 in order to limit possible endogeneity: income as measured by
real per capita GDP (in logs), an inverse measure of credit market regulation (higher ﬁgures
imply less regulation), bank credit to the private sector over GDP, and current account over
GDP.4 Results from ﬁtting eq. (1) to the data are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Cross sectional regression analysis. Dependent variable: percentage change in real
GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline NDin NDin NDout NDout
log real pc GDP -1.817 -3.153** -3.334** -1.615 -0.941
credit mkt regul -1.621** -1.409* -1.212* -1.656** -1.568**
domcredprvy 0.024** 0.017 0.021** 0.025** 0.022**





Obs. 53 53 52 53 53
Adj.R2 0.125 0.156 0.313 0.109 0.123
The baseline model without network indicators (column 1) suggests that high income coun 
tries and countries with less regulated capital markets suﬀered more pronounced downturns.
Bank credit has a positive, yet rather small, impact on the real economy: while this may appear
counterintuitive at ﬁrst, since the ﬁnancial crisis should have hit more severely countries where
credit had been overabundant, larger amount of bank credit helped to sustain economic activity
or, looking at the ﬂip side, GDP suﬀered more in countries that experienced more pronounced
credit crunches. Finally, as reported elsewhere (Frankel and Saravelos, 2011), larger current
account surpluses partly shielded economies from the crisis.
In columns (2–5) we add network measures in the form of in  and out degree.5 In degree
(number of countries whose securities are held by the country under consideration) exerts a
positive eﬀect on GDP growth; even when we add a logarithmic term to account for possible
nonlinear eﬀects, the marginal eﬀect of an increase in in degree remains positive for most values,
turning negative only for very high values of the index (namely for in degree larger than 60
over a maximum of 73). Furthermore, inclusion of this (linear and log) network indicator
This correction does not alter the main results so that we stick to the original measure.
4Data are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank), apart from credit market regulation,
which comes from the Economic Freedom of the Word database maintained by the Fraser’s Institute.
5Network measures are based on Total Portfolio holdings. We experimented with a number of higher-order
measures besides node degree, but the associated coeﬃcients turned out to be seldom signiﬁcant.
15signiﬁcantly improves the ﬁt of the regression, raising the adjusted R2 from 0.125 to 0.313.
On the contrary, the number of creditors of a country (out degree) does not have a signiﬁcant
impact on the performance of the real economy during the period under scrutiny.
Although of the previous literature has focused on real measures of crisis intensity, it can
be argued that until early 2009 the crisis had remained mainly ﬁnancial, with its full impact on
the real economy not yet apparent. We wonder, then, whether the lack of strong results may
simply come from the choice of the crisis measure.
To investigate the issue further we replicate our econometric exercise using as the dependent
variable volatility adjusted stock market returns between Sep. 15, 2008 and Mar 31, 2009
(Frankel and Saravelos, 2011) computed as:
radjusted =
[(Pt=T/Pt=0)252/N − 1] × 100
std(((Pt/Pt−1)252/N − 1) × 100)
, (2)
where Pt are stock prices at time t, N is the number of observations and std(X) is the standard
deviation of X.6
Table 2: Cross sectional regression analysis. Dependent variable volatility adjusted stock mar 
ket returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
baseline NDin NDout ANND_outout
log real pc GDP -2.575*** -6.331*** -7.375*** -5.438*** -3.500*** -5.622*** -4.328***
credit mkt regul -1.063 -0.784 -1.031 -0.448 0.083 -0.571 -0.234
Bk NPL/Loans -0.397*** -0.452*** -0.626*** -0.379*** -0.288** -0.434*** -0.390***





ANND out-out -0.726** -11.841*
log ANND out-out 562.868*
Obs. 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Adj.R2 0.140 0.265 0.316 0.388 0.519 0.363 0.403
Column (1) reports the baseline model without network indicators. We see that richer
countries experienced a larger downturn in stock market performance, as they were more heavily
exposed to the subprime and the U.S. ﬁnancial market. Credit market regulation seems not to
play a relevant role here, whereas the health of the banking sector does inﬂuence the overall
performance of the market. Finally, a positive current account balance limits the intensity of
6Data for the relevant stock market indexes are retrieved from Datastream.
16the crisis.
When we augment the econometric model by means of network measures, the ﬁt improves
substantially, with the adjusted R2 moving from 0.14 to 0.27 (column 2), or even to 0.52
(column 5). Both node in  and out degree have the same behavior when entered linearly in
the regression: having more creditors or more debtors increases stock market performance.
However, when we add both a linear and logarithmic term in order to gage the presence of
nonlinear eﬀects, the behavior changes slightly. The estimated coeﬃcients imply that, all else
equal, an increase in the number of debtors (in degree) for a country has a negative eﬀect for
very low values of in degree, but starts exerting a positive impact for values as low as 15. When
we turn to the number of creditors (out degree) the marginal eﬀect of higher connectedness is
positive for all meaningful values of the statistic.
Previously, we stated that the average nearest neighbor degree (ANND) allows to move
two step away from each node, and look and the average number of partners of its immediate
neighbors. Table 2 reports results for ANND_outout, i.e. the average number of creditors of a
country’s creditors. As explained before, a higher number indicates a more complex chain of
credit ﬂows potentially testiﬁes for higher liquidity thus implying higher resilience to shocks, but
also a higher probability that some of the two step away partner is hit by a shock. Estimation
results suggest stock market returns are increasing in ANND up to values around 47, then
slightly decreasing.7
Overall, the cross sectional analysis provides prima facie evidence that adding network
measures does improve the explanatory power of the empirical model. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd
evidence of nonlinear eﬀects: in line with the recent theoretical models (Iori et al., 2006; Caccioli
et al., 2011; Haldane and May, 2011), the high degree of heterogeneity that characterizes the
IFN breaks down the monotone relationship between connectedness and diversiﬁcation beneﬁts,
making the network more robust, yet more fragile.
Thus far we have limited the analysis to Total Portfolio holdings only, and restricted the
number of econometric speciﬁcations for which we present detailed results. In what follows we
provide a far richer analysis based on GMM panel regressions, which enable us to overcome
(at least partially) potential problems related to the small sample size, endogeneity and the
omitted variable bias. Given that results based on stock market returns perform better than
7It is worth noting that the mean for ANND_outout is around 42.
17those obtained looking at the change in real GDP, that in the previous literature the choice of
either one seems not to dramatically aﬀect the outcome of the analysis, and that we will explore
a relatively large number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, in the rest of the econometric exercise we
use adjusted returns as our preferred crisis indicator.
4.3 Panel GMM estimation
The “ideal” model to estimate in the panel GMM setting is:
yit = αxit + βgit + ci + uit (3)
git = γx
′
it + θyit + ci + vit (4)
where, again, yit is any measure of ﬁnancial crisis, xit is the vector of economic controls, git
is the vector of network measures, ci is the individual unobserved eﬀect and uit is the error
component, i = {1...74} and t = {2001...2008}. However, we are just interested in the
estimation of the ﬁrst equation of the system. Therefore, the problems reside in how to remove
ci and how to cope with the fact that g is endogenous.
We use Arellano Bond diﬀerence estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) to remove the in 
dividual eﬀects that make the error term both autocorrelated and correlated with the lagged
dependent variable. To deal with this we can use yit−k with k > 1 as instruments for ∆yit−1.
That is, we can use the moment condition: E(∆uityit−k) = 0,k > 1. As a consequence, we
assume only sequential exogeneity, not strict exogeneity of the error term. The asymptotic
covariance matrix is computed in the standard 2 step way with the addition of the Windmeijer
(2005) correction for ﬁnite samples. Given that we want to control for the crisis period (2008) in
the panel estimation, we include crisis dummies variables as interaction terms with the network
indicators.
Although the proposed GMM approach is a ﬁrst step in the right direction, it seems that we
have to further reﬁne the estimation exercise in order to address the robustness and reliability
of our results. There are a number of issues that one can think when reporting the results
for regressions based on a given set of economic and network controls. It is plausible to think
that multiple network measures could be included in the regression and diﬀerent indicators are
18statistically signiﬁcant for the diﬀerent layers of the IFN (total portfolio investments, equities,
total debt securities, short  and long term debt).
However, the small sample size does not allow for speciﬁcations where many network in 
dicators are included simultaneously as controls: this could lead to statistical anomalies and
small sample biases. The problem of the number of observations is not something that can be
ﬁxed, but it is possible to perform a more thorough exploratory exercise where the diﬀerent
layers of the IFN are considered and also more network indicators are included.
Using the GMM estimation described above and the same economic controls as in all the
previous regressions, we look at diﬀerent econometric speciﬁcations that include four network
variables at a time, out of all the following network variables, speciﬁed both in levels and in
logs: NDin, NDout, ANND_inin, ANND_inout, ANND_outin, ANND_outout, NSin, NSout,
ANNS_inin, ANNS_inout, ANNS_outin, ANNS_outout, BCC, WCC, binary authority cen 
trality (BAC), binary hub centrality (BHC), weighted authority centrality (WAC) and weighted
hub centrality (WHC).
The four network controls selected enter the regression with their respective crisis dummy
interaction term. We estimate regressions that result from all possible combinations for the
network indicators. There are 26 network indicators to be considered but these can be used in
levels or logs (for a total of 52). Therefore, there are 270725 possible econometric speciﬁcations
to be estimated for each of the IFN layers, for a grand total of 1353625 regressions.
The reason for estimating all possible combinations relies on the desire of checking for the
robustness of the results. One could select one speciﬁcation and interpret the coeﬃcients and
their statistical signiﬁcance but here we want to see how stable are the results for the network
eﬀects when considering all possible speciﬁcations.
In order to visualize and interpret the results we use ﬁlled contour plots that show the
bi variate density of the estimated coeﬃcients with their respective p values. Each contour
plot contains   on average   9000 coeﬃcient/p values pairs. The idea is that if the density
is concentrated around a given range, far from zero, for the coeﬃcient and at low p values
(below 0.1) this can be used to argue that the regressor is likely to be positively or negatively
signiﬁcant. We show two examples of signiﬁcant regressors in Figure 10 and two examples of
not signiﬁcant regressors in Figure 11 (all the others plots are available upon request). In Table
193, instead, we report mean, median and standard deviations of the signiﬁcant variables.
Table 3: GMM regression analysis: signiﬁcant regressors
Regressor Layer Mean Median STD
caccyrat 3.16 3.12 0.63
ln_gdp_ppp -163.89 -160.10 54.83
NDin TPI 4.42 4.32 1.22
ES 3.22 3.22 0.66
TDS 3.94 3.77 1.01
NDout TPI 2.64 2.63 0.82
ES 2.01 1.97 0.48
log(NDout) TPI 70.50 53.68 51.90
TDS 58.15 43.20 46.81
ANND_inin TPI 7.09 7.37 5.96
TDS 5.92 6.19 5.45
log(ANND_inin) TPI 430.35 371.23 201.90
TDS 345.64 295.90 165.83
ANND_inout TPI 3.27 5.10 6.26
TDS 5.24 5.26 3.73
log(ANND_inout) TPI 331.32 302.90 214.95
TDS 323.83 287.10 138.26
ANND_outout TPI 4.01 4.29 3.69
TDS 3.018 3.03 3.43
log(ANND_outout) TPI 249.60 209.29 144.25
TDS 195.05 148.03 126.88
BCC TPI -294.05 -322.57 326.26
log(BCC) TPI -212.08 -242.47 244.30
ES -232.19 -226.39 64.84
TDS -211.80 -207.77 125.65
BAC TDS -10460.26 -9954.8 2703.47
log(BAC) TPI -143.59 -126.37 66.99
TDS -122.75 -103.84 70.40
log(NSin) TPI 44.13 42.03 17.36
ES 30.05 28.34 8.22
log(NSout) TPI 27.34 25.90 8.01
ES 16.17 14.88 6.46
log(ANNS_inin) TPI 96.19 95.11 22.94
TDS 89.40 88.45 21.47
log(ANNS_inout) TPI 97.65 96.49 22.43
TDS 88.70 87.04 22.10
log(ANNS_outout) TPI 20.74 15.63 28.52
ES 23.17 15.23 17.48
TDS 35.81 25.74 28.52
log(WCC) TPI 71.14 71.28 21.47
ES 75.90 77.0375 9.88
TDS 57.73 56.09 19.45
The results show that many of the signiﬁcant regressors have positive eﬀects on the stock
market returns and these ﬁndings provide support for the risk diversiﬁcation hypothesis. How 
ever, we cannot completely rule out the notion that higher connectedness also increase vulnera 
bility. On the one hand, when we look at ﬁrst and second order measures (node degree/strength
indicators and average nearest neighbor degree/strength indicators), it appears that being well
connected and having well connected neighbors is beneﬁcial for the performance of a country.
20On the other hand, when we look at higher order statistics (like clustering and centrality), the
picture is somewhat diﬀerent. Indeed, high authority scores and clustering in the binary net 
works increases the risk of being negatively hit in a considerable way, probably because when
a shock hits one of the members of the cluster, then all the others are immediately aﬀected as
well. At the same time, a high WCC shields countries from ﬁnancial contagion, a result that is
driven by the fact that higher values for this index are associated with lower heterogeneity in
the strength of links within the cluster. These results conﬁrm that knowing the exact role and
position of a country within the IFN does matter when we are dealing with the transmission
of shocks.
The results of the current study also shed some light on the discussion regarding whether
or not the degree of connectivity for a country leads to diﬀerent dynamics during the recent
ﬁnancial crisis when compared to previous (stable) years. Based on the contour plots we studied,
the coeﬃcients of the interaction eﬀects between the crisis dummies and the network indicators
are not signiﬁcant. In other words, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the eﬀect
of network connectivity on economic (stock market) performance is the same in both pre crisis
and crisis years. This is a relevant ﬁnding because it suggests not only that network indicators
can be used to predict country vulnerability to shocks, but also that their role is stable during
periods of substantial market distress, making them all the more useful and important from a
policy perspective.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the structural properties of the IFN in the period 2001–10, and found that
the network is characterized by a disassortative core periphery architecture and the presence
of a small number of ﬁnancial hubs forming a rich club. The 2007–2008 crisis resulted not only
in a reduction in the amount of securities traded, but also induced changes in the topology of
the network and in the time evolution of its statistical properties. This has happened, however,
without changing the disassortative, core periphery structure of the IFN architecture.
These descriptive results have been used to feed econometric models where measures of
crisis intensity are regressed against macroeconomic variables and network measures. Using
both cross sectional and panel GMM techniques we ﬁnd that network measures provide useful
21information and improve the ﬁt of empirical models used in the literature on early warning
systems.
Consistently with theoretical models of network dynamics and evolution (such as Allen and
Gale, 2000; Gai and Kapadia, 2010) we have found here that higher interconnectedness reduces
the severity of the crisis, as it allows adverse shocks to dissipate quicker. However, the systemic
risk hypothesis cannot be completely dismissed and being central in the network, if the node is
not a member of a rich club, puts the country in an adverse and risky position in times of crises.
Moreover, we ﬁnd strong evidence of nonlinear eﬀects, as predicted by recent theoretical models
(Iori et al., 2006; Caccioli et al., 2011) once the high degree of heterogeneity that characterizes
the IFN is taken into account.
Our analysis can be extended in at least three ways. First, one interesting route for future
research might involve performing network resilience tests to evaluate the impact of node 
targeted shocks or node failures on network structure, given the high degree of heterogeneity
featured by the IFN. Second, one may explore in more detail the space of crisis indicators,
possibly building synthetic measures in line with Rose and Spiegel (2010). Finally, the impact
of country network position on early warning systems might be studied in more detail, focusing
not only on country network proﬁles within the IFN, but also within a more general macroe 
conomic multi network where countries are nodes and links represent a host of macroeconomic
interlinkages and interaction channels, including ﬁnancial relations, trade in goods and services,
foreign direct investment, migrations and the like.
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A Aggregate Network Statistics
In this Appendix we provide formal deﬁnitions for aggregate (network wide) statistics. We
begin by:
Network Density (dens) Let m bet the number of edges present in the network in a given
year and N be the number of nodes (i.e. countries). Then, we deﬁne the network density (dens)
as m
N(N−1).
Asymmetry of a binary or weighted directed network can be measured in many ways. First,
one can assess the extent to which a network is asymmetric by computing the index proposed in
Fagiolo (2006). This is obtained as an average over all the links of squared diﬀerences between
ij and ji adjacency  or weight matrix entries, properly rescaled by the norm of the weight
or adjacency matrix itself. The index has nice properties and can be shown to be normally 
distributed under some mild conditions about link weight distribution. In a weighted network,
however, this index treats all link unbalances the same, as it does not consider the relative
impact that a given unbalance might have over total weight carried by a directed link, i.e. the
sum of ij and ji weights. Since in principle it may be interesting to compute also asymmetry
over relative unbalance averages, we deﬁne the following:
Relative Binary Network Asymmetry (basym) Let A bet the binary adjacency matrix
of the network in a given year and N be the number of nodes (i.e. countries). Then, we deﬁne










is the Dirac delta function.
25Relative Weighted Network Asymmetry (wasym) Let W bet the weighted adjacency
matrix of the network in a given year and N be the number of nodes (i.e. countries). Then, we










where δ(x) is the Dirac delta function.
Density and asymmetry measures are bounded between zero and one. Density is equal
to one when the graph is complete and to zero when there are no links between the nodes.
Relative unbalance asymmetry indicators equal one (indicating perfect asymmetry) when ij
and ji links exist only in one direction; and zero (perfect symmetry) when ij and ji links exist
in both directions (and have the same weights). We refer to Fagiolo (2006) for the statistical
properties of the level unbalance asymmetry indicator.
B Node-Speciﬁc Binary Node Network Statistics
The most important node speciﬁc binary network statistics employed in the paper are:
Node in-degree (NDin) Let eij = 1 if there exists an edge from country i to country j and
let Nin




i eji. From an economic point of view, node in degree in the IFN is the number
of debtors that country i has.
Node out-degree (NDout) Let eij = 1 if there exists an edge from country i to country j
and let Nout
i be the set of out neighbors of country i. Then, we deﬁne country i’s node out 
degree as: NDouti =
P
j∈Nout
i eij. From an economic point of view, node out degree in the IFN
is the number of creditors that country i has.
Total Node degree (ND) We deﬁne total node degree as the sum of node in degree and
node out degree, i.e. NDi = NDini + NDouti. From an economic point of view, total node
degree in the IFN is the number of creditors and debtors that country i has.
Average nearest-neighbor degree (ANND) Let Ni be the set of neighbors of country i,
then we deﬁne average nearest neighbor degree as: ANND =
P
j∈Ni NDj
NDi . From an economic
point of view, average nearest neighbor degree in the IFN tells us how many creditors/debtors
have   on average   country i’s creditors/debtors.
26Average nearest-neighbor in-in degree (ANND_inin) Let Nin
i be the set of in neighbors






From an economic point of view, average nearest neighbor in in degree in the IFN tells us how
many debtors have   on average   country i’s debtors.
Average nearest-neighbor in-out degree (ANND_inout) Let Nin
i be the set of in neighbors





NDini . From an economic point of view, average nearest neighbor in out degree in
the IFN tells us how many creditors have   on average   country i’s debtors.
Average nearest-neighbor out-in degree (ANND_outin) Let Nout
i be the set of out 





NDouti . From an economic point of view, average nearest neighbor out in degree in the
IFN tells us how many debtors have   on average   country i’s creditors.
Average nearest-neighbor out-out degree (ANND_outout) Let Nout
i be the set of out 





NDouti . From an economic point of view, average nearest neighbor out out degree tells
us how many creditors have   on average   country i’s creditors.
Binary clustering coeﬃcient (BCC) Binary clustering coeﬃcient expresses the likelihood
that any two neighbors of a country are also neighbors of themselves. Then, we deﬁne the
binary clustering coeﬃcient for country i as: BCCi =
(A3)ii
NDi(NDi−1). From an economic point of
view, binary clustering tells us which is the probability that two creditors/debtors of a country
are also creditors/debtors among themselves.
C Weighted Node Network Statistics
The most important node speciﬁc weighted network statistics employed in the paper are:
Node in-strength (NSin) Let wij be the weight associated to the edge leaving country i
and reaching country j and let Nin
i be the set of in neighbors of country i. Then, we deﬁne
country i’s node in strength as: NSini =
P
j∈Nin
i wji. From an economic point of view, node
27in strength is the total amount of credit that country i has accumulated with respect to its
neighbors or, putting it diﬀerently, the amount of investments that country i has made on its
neighbors.
Node out-strength (NSout) Let wij be the weight associated to the edge leaving country i
and reaching country j and let Nout
i be the set of out neighbors of country i. Then, we deﬁne
country i’s node out strength as: NSouti =
P
j∈Nout
i wij. From an economic point of view,
node out strength is the total amount of debt that country i has accumulated with respect to
its neighbors or, putting it diﬀerently, the amount of investments i’s neighbors have made in
the country.
Total node strength (NS) We deﬁne total node strength as the sum of node in strength
and node out strength, i.e. NSi = NSini + NSouti. From an economic point of view, total
node strength is the overall amount of dollars of securities issued or held by country i.
Average nearest-neighbor strength (ANNS) Let Ni be the set of neighbors of country i,
then we deﬁne average nearest neighbor strength as: ANNS =
P
j∈Ni NSj
NDi . From an economic
point of view, average nearest neighbor strength tells us   on average   the overall amount of
dollars of securities issued or held by country i’s creditors/debtors.
Average nearest-neighbor in-in strength (ANNS_inin) Let Nin
i be the set of in neighbors





NDini . From an economic point of view, average nearest neighbor in in strength tells
  on average   the overall amount of dollars of securities held by country i’s debtors.
Average nearest-neighbor in-out strength (ANNS_inout) Let Nin
i be the set of in 





NDini . From an economic point of view, average in out nearest neighbor strength tells
us   on average   the overall amount of dollars of securities issued by country i’s debtors.
Average nearest-neighbor out-in strength (ANNS_outin) Let Nout
i be the set of out 





NDouti . From an economic point of view, average nearest neighbor out in strength tells
us   on average   the overall amount of dollars of securities held by country i’s creditors.
28Average nearest-neighbor out-out strength (ANNS_outout) Let Nout
i be the set of





NDouti . From an economic point of view, average nearest neighbor out out strength tells
us   on average   the overall amount of dollars of securities issued by country i’s creditors.
Weighted clustering coeﬃcient (WCC) Weighted clustering coeﬃcient expresses the weighted
likelihood that any two neighbors of a country are also neighbors of themselves considering the
intensity of their interactions. That is, we deﬁne the weighted clustering coeﬃcient for country





NDi(NDi−1). From an economic point of view, weighted clustering tells us which
is the weighted probability that two creditors/debtors of a country are also creditors/debtors
among themselves by putting more weight on stronger interactions.
D Null Models
To compute the rich club coeﬃcient, we have employed the following random null network
models:
• M1 Links are completely reshuﬄed, i.e. entries of the weighted adjacency matrix are fully
permuted;
• M2 Weights are reshuﬄed but the binary adjacency matrix is kept constant, i.e. only
link weights are shuﬄed and the degree sequence remains the same;
• M3 Out links are completely reshuﬄed, i.e. node out degree and node out strength remain
constant but the binary adjacency matrix does not;
• M4 Weights of out links are reshuﬄed, i.e. node out degree, node out strength and the
binary adjacency matrix remain constant;
• M5 In links are completely reshuﬄed, i.e. node in degree and node in strength remain
constant but the binary adjacency matrix does not;
• M6 Weights of in links are reshuﬄed, i.e. node in degree, node in strength and the binary
adjacency matrix remain constant.
29E Rich Club Coeﬃcient
Rich Club Coeﬃcient (RCC) Deﬁne r as the measure of richness of a node, let W>¯ r be
the sum of weights of all the links connecting those countries that exhibit a richness parameter
larger than a given threshold ¯ r where the number of such links is E>¯ r. Deﬁne Wtop as the sum of
the weights associated to the E>¯ r strongest links present in the network. Then, if we compute
the ratio φw(¯ r) =
W>¯ r








b (¯ r), where B
is the number of network instances generated with the null model.
F Financial Hubs and Authorities
Tables 4–7 show the rankings of the top 30 countries in each of the four centrality measures
considered: binary hub centrality (BHC), binary authority centrality (BAC), weighted hub
centrality (WHC) and weighted authority centrality (WAC).
30Table 4: Binary Hub Centrality
Rank 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 United States United States United States United States United States United States United States United Kingdom United States United States
2 United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom Germany Luxembourg United States Netherlands Netherlands
3 France Germany Germany Germany Germany France Netherlands Germany France Germany
4 Germany Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands France Netherlands France France Luxembourg Luxembourg
5 Netherlands France Italy France Netherlands Italy Canada Luxembourg United Kingdom Switzerland
6 Japan Canada France Australia Ireland Luxembourg United Kingdom Ireland Germany France
7 Canada Luxembourg Luxembourg Switzerland Luxembourg United Kingdom Ireland Netherlands Ireland Canada
8 Italy Sweden Japan Italy Canada Canada Germany Canada Canada United Kingdom
9 Luxembourg Italy Canada Ireland Switzerland Cayman Islands Australia Switzerland Switzerland Ireland
10 Switzerland Switzerland Australia Luxembourg Australia Switzerland Spain Cayman Islands Italy Spain
11 Cayman Islands Spain Switzerland Cayman Islands Italy Ireland Cayman Islands Austria Cayman Islands Cayman Islands
12 Spain Belgium Ireland Canada Spain Australia Italy Italy Australia Brazil
13 Belgium Australia Austria Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Australia Spain Australia
14 Australia Japan Cayman Islands Japan Cayman Islands Japan Switzerland Sweden Sweden Austria
15 Sweden Cayman Islands Sweden Spain Japan Finland Japan Spain Austria Denmark
16 Ireland Austria Spain Belgium Finland Spain Austria Belgium Denmark Belgium
17 Denmark Ireland Belgium Austria Austria Belgium Norway Norway Belgium Russian Federation
18 Austria Finland Bermuda Finland Belgium Norway Russian Federation Russian Federation Norway Sweden
19 Norway Brazil Finland Bermuda Bermuda Austria Belgium Japan Hong Kong Italy
20 Bermuda Norway Portugal Brazil Republic of Korea Brazil Finland Brazil Brazil Japan
21 Finland Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Russian Federation Hong Kong Bermuda Republic of Korea Norway
22 Brazil Bermuda Mexico Hong Kong Brazil Mexico Bermuda Denmark Russian Federation Bermuda
23 Hong Kong Portugal Brazil Norway Russian Federation Hong Kong Singapore Hong Kong Japan Finland
24 Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Norway Russian Federation Norway Bermuda Mexico Finland Greece Hong Kong
25 Portugal Hong Kong Hong Kong Portugal Mexico Denmark Denmark South Africa Finland Republic of Korea
26 Argentina Russian Federation Russian Federation Republic of Korea Hong Kong Singapore Brazil Turkey Bermuda Jersey
27 Russian Federation Thailand Singapore Mexico Singapore Republic of Korea Turkey Jersey India Mexico
28 Singapore Singapore Greece Singapore Greece Greece South Africa Greece South Africa India
29 Venezuela Turkey Republic of Korea Greece Portugal Malaysia Netherlands Antilles Mexico Mexico South Africa
30 Turkey New Zealand Poland Argentina New Zealand South Africa Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Netherlands Antilles Poland
3
1Table 5: Binary Authority Centrality
Rank 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 Guernsey Switzerland Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg United Kingdom Ireland Austria United Kingdom Guernsey
2 Luxembourg Luxembourg Switzerland Germany Ireland Luxembourg United Kingdom Luxembourg Luxembourg United Kingdom
3 United States United States United States Switzerland Switzerland Austria Austria Netherlands Ireland Luxembourg
4 Switzerland Ireland Germany United States Germany Ireland Switzerland Switzerland Germany Switzerland
5 Austria Austria Denmark Ireland Guernsey Switzerland France France Austria Germany
6 United Kingdom Italy Italy Austria France Guernsey Netherlands United Kingdom Switzerland Austria
7 Italy France Netherlands Italy Italy Germany Italy Germany Netherlands Ireland
8 Denmark Denmark Ireland Guernsey Austria Netherlands Germany Denmark France Japan
9 France Netherlands France United Kingdom United States France Denmark Italy Denmark Italy
10 Germany Guernsey Austria France Netherlands Italy Luxembourg Ireland United States France
11 Netherlands Germany Guernsey Netherlands Denmark Denmark United States Guernsey Belgium United States
12 Belgium Belgium Belgium Jersey Jersey Japan Japan United States Japan Netherlands
13 Japan Japan Jersey Denmark Canada United States Belgium Norway Italy Denmark
14 Bermuda Spain Canada Belgium United Kingdom Belgium Guernsey Belgium Jersey Belgium
15 Canada Jersey Spain Canada Japan Hong Kong Jersey Japan Guernsey Bermuda
16 Isle of Man Sweden Japan Spain Belgium Jersey Norway Jersey Norway Jersey
17 Spain Bermuda Sweden Hong Kong Hong Kong Canada Sweden Hong Kong Canada Sweden
18 Jersey Canada United Kingdom Japan Cyprus Cyprus Spain Sweden Sweden Canada
19 Sweden Cayman Islands Cayman Islands Cyprus Spain Norway Canada Canada Cyprus Norway
20 Ireland Hong Kong Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Sweden Republic of Korea Cyprus Hong Kong Republic of Korea
21 Netherlands Antilles Netherlands Antilles Norway Sweden Norway Spain Hong Kong Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Hong Kong
22 Norway Norway Cyprus Norway Cayman Islands Republic of Korea Cyprus Bermuda Bermuda Slovenia
23 Australia Isle of Man Isle of Man Greece Sweden Portugal Bermuda Greece Slovenia Bahrain, Kingdom of
24 Cyprus Malaysia Finland Republic of Korea Greece Bermuda Cayman Islands Netherlands Antilles Cayman Islands Greece
25 Cayman Islands Greece Netherlands Antilles Isle of Man Portugal Cayman Islands Netherlands Antilles Cayman Islands Netherlands Antilles Hungary
26 Greece Bahamas, The Singapore Singapore Netherlands Antilles Greece Portugal Isle of Man Greece Cayman Islands
27 Bahrain, Kingdom of Australia Greece Finland Republic of Korea Netherlands Antilles Greece Chile Iceland Cyprus
28 Malaysia Cyprus Hong Kong Macao Finland Finland Finland Bahrain, Kingdom of Bahrain, Kingdom of South Africa
29 Portugal Chile Australia Netherlands Antilles Singapore Slovak Republic Czech Republic Portugal Malaysia Lithuania
30 Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Czech Republic Czech Republic Hungary Isle of Man Macao Slovak Republic Iceland
3
2Table 6: Weighted Hub Centrality
Rank 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 United States United States United States United States United States United States United States United States United States United States
2 United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom
3 Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany
4 France Netherlands France France Japan France France France France France
5 Netherlands France Netherlands Netherlands France Japan Cayman Islands Cayman Islands Cayman Islands Cayman Islands
6 Japan Italy Italy Cayman Islands Cayman Islands Cayman Islands Japan Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
7 Cayman Islands Cayman Islands Japan Italy Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Italy Italy Canada
8 Italy Japan Cayman Islands Japan Italy Italy Canada Japan Luxembourg Japan
9 Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Italy Luxembourg Canada Luxembourg
10 Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Spain Japan Italy
11 Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Ireland Spain Australia
12 Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Ireland Switzerland Ireland Ireland Canada Ireland Ireland
13 Bermuda Ireland Australia Switzerland Ireland Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Australia Switzerland
14 Australia Australia Ireland Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Switzerland Spain
15 Sweden Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Brazil Brazil
16 Ireland Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Brazil Sweden Sweden Sweden
17 Finland Belgium Belgium Belgium Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Sweden Austria Belgium Republic of Korea
18 Belgium Finland Finland Republic of Korea Belgium Belgium Republic of Korea Belgium Bermuda Bermuda
19 Hong Kong Republic of Korea Austria Austria Brazil Brazil Hong Kong Jersey Republic of Korea Hong Kong
20 Republic of Korea Austria Republic of Korea Finland Mexico Hong Kong Finland Portugal Austria Belgium
21 Brazil Netherlands Antilles Brazil Greece Finland Austria Belgium Greece Hong Kong Austria
22 Austria Hong Kong Mexico Brazil Austria Mexico Austria Brazil Portugal Norway
23 Netherlands Antilles Brazil Hong Kong Mexico Jersey Finland India Republic of Korea Norway India
24 Singapore Portugal Greece Hong Kong Hong Kong Jersey Netherlands Antilles Hong Kong Jersey Mexico
25 Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Norway Norway Finland Greece Jersey
26 Norway Greece Netherlands Antilles Jersey Netherlands Antilles Netherlands Antilles Mexico Norway Finland Denmark
27 Greece Singapore Jersey Norway Greece Greece Russian Federation Denmark Mexico Finland
28 Portugal Norway Norway Netherlands Antilles Norway Denmark Jersey Netherlands Antilles Denmark South Africa
29 Israel Israel Portugal Portugal Russian Federation Russian Federation Greece Mexico India Russian Federation
30 Russian Federation Russian Federation Singapore Singapore Portugal Singapore Denmark India Netherlands Antilles Singapore
3
3Table 7: Weighted Authority Centrality
Rank 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 Japan Japan United States United States United States United States United States Japan United States Japan
2 United States United States Japan Japan Japan United Kingdom United Kingdom United States Japan United States
3 United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom Japan Japan United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom
4 Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg France Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Ireland Luxembourg Luxembourg
5 France France France Luxembourg France France France Luxembourg Ireland Ireland
6 Germany Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland France France France
7 Ireland Germany Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany
8 Netherlands Netherlands Germany Germany Germany Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
9 Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Canada Canada Italy Italy Canada
10 Canada Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Canada Italy Italy Canada Canada Bermuda
11 Switzerland Canada Canada Canada Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland
12 Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Bermuda Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Bermuda Bermuda Italy
13 Belgium Belgium Spain Spain Spain Spain Belgium Belgium Norway Norway
14 Sweden Spain Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Spain Norway Belgium Hong Kong
15 Hong Kong Hong Kong Jersey Jersey Jersey Jersey Norway Spain Hong Kong Australia
16 Spain Jersey Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Norway Hong Kong Hong Kong Spain Belgium
17 Jersey Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Hong Kong Australia Jersey Australia Sweden
18 Australia Norway Norway Norway Norway Sweden Jersey Australia Sweden Spain
19 Norway Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Sweden Sweden Singapore Jersey
20 Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Denmark Denmark
21 Denmark Singapore Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Singapore Denmark Austria Singapore
22 Singapore Cayman Islands Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore Denmark Singapore Jersey Austria
23 Cayman Islands Guernsey Guernsey Guernsey Guernsey Guernsey Guernsey Guernsey Guernsey Guernsey
24 Guernsey Denmark Cayman Islands Finland Finland Finland Finland Portugal Finland Finland
25 Finland Finland Finland Portugal Cayman Islands Cayman Islands Portugal Finland Portugal South Africa
26 South Africa Portugal Portugal Cayman Islands Portugal Portugal Republic of Korea Greece Greece Chile
27 Isle of Man South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa Republic of Korea Greece Republic of Korea South Africa Portugal
28 Portugal Isle of Man Isle of Man Greece Greece South Africa Cayman Islands South Africa Chile Republic of Korea
29 Argentina Argentina Greece Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Greece Chile Cayman Islands Republic of Korea Israel
30 Netherlands Antilles Netherlands Antilles New Zealand Isle of Man Isle of Man Chile South Africa Chile Israel Greece
3
4(a) Network density (b) Dollars of securities exchanged
(c) Absolute binary network asymmetry (d) Absolute weighted network asymmetry
(e) Relative binary network asymmetry (f) Relative weighted network asymmetry
Figure 3: IFN Aggregate Behavior. Top left: density. Top Right: value of securities traded
(in current dollars). Middle Left: absolute binary network asymmetry index. Middle Right:
absolute weighted network asymmetry index. Bottom Left: relative binary network asymmetry
index. Bottom Right: relative weighted network asymmetry index. Color lines refer to the ﬁve
network layers. Blue: TPI. Green: ES. Red: TDS. Cyan: LTDS. Magenta: STDS.
35(a) TPI - #creditors/debtors (b) TPI - # debtors (c) TPI - # creditors
(d) ES - #creditors/debtors (e) ES - # debtors (f) ES - # creditors
(g) TDS - #creditors/debtors (h) TDS - # debtors (i) TDS - # creditors
Figure 4: Node degree distributions. TPI (top), ES (middle), and TDS (bottom). Years on the
x axis (e.g. 1 = year 2001), node degree on the y axis, kernel density on the z axis.
(a) ANND - TPI (b) ANND - ES (c) ANND - TDS
Figure 5: Average nearest neighbor node degree distributions: years on the x axis (e.g. 1 = year
2001), ANND on the y axis, density on the z axis.
36(a) Binary clustering - TPI (b) Binary clustering - ES (c) Binary clustering - TDS
Figure 6: Binary clustering distributions. Years on the x axis (e.g. 1 = year 2001). Binary
clustering coeﬃcients on the y axis. Kernel density on the z axis.
(a) ND vs NS (b) ND vs ANND (c) NS vs ANNS
Figure 7: Correlations - 1: a) correlation between the number of partners and the total value
of the securities exchanged; c) network disassortativity.
(a) ND vs BCC (b) NS vs WCC
Figure 8: Correlations - 2: Local Rich club evidence
37Figure 9: Rich-club behavior. Null Model: M1, see Appendix D (links are completely reshuﬄed
so as to fully permute the weight matrix).
(a) NDin - TPI (b) log(WCC) - TPI
Figure 10: GMM regression analysis: Examples of signiﬁcant regressors
(a) log(BAC) - ES (b) WAC - TPI
Figure 11: GMM regression analysis: Examples of not signiﬁcant regressors
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